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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mariano Perez, Jr., appeals in these consolidated cases from the
judgment of dismissal entered upon the district court's order summarily
dismissing his petitions for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In February 2005, Perez threatened his ex-girlfriend and three other
individuals with a loaded handgun.

State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 385, 179

P.3d 346, 348 (Ct. App. 2008). Three days later, he shot a police officer four
times at point-blank range.

&

The state charged him in one case with three

counts of aggravated assault, one count of felony injury to child, and one count
of unlawful possession of a firearm, and in a separate case with aggravated
battery on a law enforcement officer, felony eluding, and unlawful possession of
a firearm.
cases.

kl

kl

The state also alleged persistent violator enhancements in both

The cases were consolidated for plea and sentencing and, pursuant

to a plea agreement, Perez pied guilty to one count of aggravated assault and to
aggravated battery on a police officer and admitted the persistent violator
allegations.

ill

In exchange, the remaining charges were dismissed.

district court imposed concurrent fixed life sentences.
sentences were affirmed on appeal.

&

&

&

The

The judgments and

at 388-89, 179 P.3d at 351-52.

Perez filed timely pro se petitions for post-conviction relief, and affidavits
in support thereof, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel in both
of the underlying criminal cases.

(R., Vol. I, pp.2-8, 54-60.)

1

Following the

appointment of post-conviction counsel (R., Vol. I, pp.16, 68), Perez filed an
amended petition, again alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel (R., Vol. I, pp.83-87). 1 Specifically, as it relates to the issue on appeal,
the amended petition alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for "Utiliz[ing]
coercive conditions of pre-trial detention to force Petitioner to enter pleas of
guilty." (R., Vol. I, p.84.)
The state answered the amended petition and moved to dismiss it (R.,
Vol. I, pp.88-90; R., Vol. 11, pp.102-267). The district court took judicial notice of
the records and transcripts in Perez's underlying criminals cases (R., Vol. I,
pp.24, 31) and dismissed Perez's amended petition in its entirety, finding that
Perez had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of
his post-conviction claims (R., Vol. I, pp.24-40). The court entered a judgment of
dismissal (R., Vol. I, pp.41-42), from which Perez timely appealed (R., Vol. I,
pp.43-46).

1

It appears Perez filed only a single amended petition, the substance of which
embraced both underlying criminal cases, but the caption of which listed only a
single case number. (R., Vol. I, pp.83-87; see also R., Vol. I, pp.1, 52-53
(registers of actions in Canyon County case numbers CV-2009-5678 and CV2009-5679).) The district court treated the amended petition as having been
filed in both post-conviction cases and disposed of the claims therein in a single
order bearing both post-conviction case numbers. (R., Vol. I, pp.24-40; see also
R., Vol. I, pp.41-42 (Judgment of Dismissal bearing both case numbers).)
2

ISSUE
Perez states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Bank's
[sic] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Perez failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his post-conviction
petition?

3

ARGUMENT
Perez Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His PostConviction Petition

A

Introduction
Perez challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition,

contending he raised a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly
coercing his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-6.) Perez's argument fails. A
review of the record and the applicable law supports the district court's
determination that Perez failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact entitling
him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Perez Failed To Establish A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact With Respect
To His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claim
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho

4

676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction

relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P.
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.
4903).

~

(citing I.C. § 19-

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application

must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b),
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
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evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522,
164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief,
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing
the petition. ~ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

~

As is relevant to this appeal, Perez's amended petition alleged that trial
counsel was ineffective for allegedly coercing Perez's guilty pleas. (R., Vol. I,
p.84.)

To overcome summary dismissal of this claim, Perez was required to

demonstrate that "(1) a material issue of fact exist[ed] as to whether counsel's
performance was deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact exist[ed] as to
whether the deficiency prejudiced [Perez's] case." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho
148, 153-54, 177 P .3d 362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (a petitioner alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance and
resulting prejudice).

To establish deficient performance, the burden was on

Perez to show that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
(1998).

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176

To establish prejudice, Perez was required to show that, but for

counsel's errors, he would not have pied guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006).

6

Applying the foregoing principles to the record before it, the district court
concluded that Perez failed to establish an issue of material fact entitling him to
an evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly
using coercive conditions of pretrial confinement to force Perez to plead guilty.
(R., Vol. I, pp.33-38.)

In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the

allegations in Perez's amended petition and accompanying affidavit with the
record of the underlying criminal proceedings, including Perez's statements,
made under oath, at the guilty plea hearing.

(Id.)

Ultimately, the court

determined that Perez's "contentions about his detention conditions were
conclusory" and that his allegations that his attorney used those conditions to
force his guilty pleas were disproved by Perez's own statements during the plea
colloquy, which were summarized by the district court as follows:
Petitioner Perez, in open court, stated that he was satisfied with his
attorney's performance and that he was not pressured, coerced, or
threatened in any way to accept the plea negotiation, which
involved the dismissal of numerous felonies and potential
sentencing enhancements. In fact, Perez told the court that he was
pleading guilty because the charges were true; that no one was
forcing him to plead guilty; that he [had] adequate time to talk to his
attorney about the charges; that his attorney had done all the
things that he would have expected her to do in representing him;
he stated that there were not things that [his attorney] had failed to
do that he had wanted her to do.
(R., Vol. I, pp.37-38.)

The district court's determination is supported by the

record (see R., Vol. I, pp.233-38 (transcript of guilty plea hearing)) and the
applicable law, and the state adopts it as its argument on appeal.

For this

Court's convenience, a copy of the district court's order is attached to this brief
as Appendix A

7

On appeal, Perez does not dispute that the record of the underlying
criminal proceedings, particularly the record of the guilty plea hearing, is
inconsistent with his post-conviction claim that trial counsel used coercive
conditions of pretrial confinement to force Perez to enter his guilty pleas. (See
generally Appellant's brief, pp.3-6.)

Rather, his sole contention on appeal

appears to be that the district court was required to accept as true the "facts"
alleged in his verified petition and affidavit, including the "factual contention" that
"his plea was not truly voluntary because he was being housed in inhuman [sic]
conditions, then when he was placed in better conditions and wanted to reject a
plea agreement, his attorney got mad at him and told him he would be going
back to the poor living conditions." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) According to Perez,
these factual contentions were sufficient, by themselves, to raise a genuine issue
of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. (Id.) Perez is incorrect.
Like any other civil litigant attempting to avoid an adverse summary
judgment ruling, a post-conviction petitioner does not raise a genuine issue of
fact by merely contradicting in an affidavit what he told the court, under oath, in a
plea hearing. See Frazier v. J.R. Simplot Co., 136 Idaho 100, 103, 29 P.3d 936,
939 (2001) (citation omitted) (impermissible to attempt to prevent an adverse
summary judgment ruling by creating factual issues in an affidavit which
contradict prior sworn deposition statements); Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126
Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 427, 435 (Ct. App. 1994) (a "sham" affidavit that
directly contradicts previous testimony may be disregarded on a summary
judgment motion). Because the allegations in Perez's affidavit were affirmatively

8

disproved by his prior sworn statements at the change of plea hearing, they did
not create a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (post-conviction allegations
insufficient for granting of relief when they are clearly disproved by the record);
Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 630 (Ct. App. 1996) (same).
Perez has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the district court's order summarily dismissing Perez's petitions for postconviction relief.
DATED this 22nd day of August 2012.

I A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney Gener

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of August 2012, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
STEPHEN D. THOMPSON
P.O. Box 1707
Ketchum, ID 83340

LAF/pm
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MAY O2 2011
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
C ATKINSON, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

MARIANO PEREZ, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV -2009-5679

.,1Jl¥:t.2DD9iS6"/·8,,
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

This matter having come before the couit on June 8, 2010, upon the Respondent State of
Idaho's Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed April 16, 201 O; and the Petitioner having been
represented by Mr. Aaron Bazzoli, Assistant Canyon County Public Defender; and the
Respondent having been represented by Mr. Bryan Taylor; and the comt having considered the
file and record in this action, the file and record in Case No. CR-2005-6559 and CR-2005-3932,
the arguments of counsel, together with the applicable law; and this cou1t having orally granted
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on June 8, 201 O; and no written order having
subsequently been filed; this court does hereby enter its written order as follows.
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ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

1

(

BACKGROUND
Petitioner Mariano Perez Jr. filed his pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction
Relief in this matter on May 19, 2009, alleging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his
underlying criminal cases, Case No. CR-2005-6559 and CR-2005-3932.

On July 22, 2009, the

court filed its Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief based on what
appeared to be the untimeliness of the Petition. On October 8, 2009, counsel for Petitioner filed
a Supplemental Response to Notice oflntent to Dismiss, clarifying that Perez had filed a Petition
for Review before the Idaho Supreme Court following the decision by the Court of Appeals. A
copy of the Order Denying Petition for Review by the Idaho Supreme Court dated July 31, 2008,
is reflected and demonstrates that the "Remittiturs" filed in Canyon County Case Nos. CR-20053932 and CR-2005-6559 on March 27, 2008, do not accurately reflect the conclusion of the
cases.
A Status Conference was conducted on February 19, 2010, attended by counsel for the
Petitioner and for the State. The court agreed with Petitioner that his May 19, 2009, filing in this
case was timely, based on the Supplemental Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss that was
filed in this action on October 8, 2009. Counsel for Petitioner further advised the court that he
believed the decisions of the Court of Appeals in the underlying criminal cases resolved the
issues raised by Petitioner's prose filing, b~t that he intended to file an Amended Petition.
Counsel for the State stipulated to the filing of an Amended Petition.
Petitioner Mariano Perez Jr, 's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on
March 15, 2010 in Case No. CV-2009-5679. 1 In that Amended Petition he raises claims arising

1

Petitioner's post-conviction pleadings were originally given two separate case numbers, CV-2009-5678 and CV20009-5679. After July 22, 2009, counsel have filed all pleadings relating to both underlying criminal actions (CR2005-3932 and CR-2005-6559) in Case No. CV-2009-5679 only, but the court will treat the pleadings as having
been filed in both CV-2009-5679 and CV-2009-5678 since they address both underlying criminal cases.
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(

from two separate cases: CR-2005-6559 (Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement Officer and
Persistent Violator); and CR-2005-3932 (Aggravated Assault and Persistent Violator). The
specific claims are as follows, with regard to both cases:
( a) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the trial court level;
(b) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the appellate level; and
( c) Cruel, inhuman and coercive conditions of confinement prior to sentencing.
Petitioner's specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are as follows:
(a) Failure to investigate Petitioner's fitness to stand trial, evaluate plea options, plead
guilty and be sentenced;
(b) Failure to advocate for adequate pre-trial conditions of detention;
(c) Utilization of coercive conditions of pre-trial detention to force Petitioner to enter
pleas of guilty; and
(d) Failure to research and present arguments on appeal as directed by Petitioner;
The Amended Petition was not verified. However, on March 19, 2010, the Petitioner caused to
be filed a Verification, wherein Petitioner Perez indicated that he had reviewed the Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and believed that the factual statements contained in that
Amended Petition "are true and genuine based on good information and belie£"
The State filed its Answer on March 29, 2010. On that same date, the State filed its
Motion for Summary Dismissal based on the alleged lack of timeliness of the filing of the
petition in this case. At a Status Conference on April 12, 2010, the State moved to withdraw the
Motion for Summary Dismissal based on timeliness. However, the State indicated its intention
to file another Motion for Summary Dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c), since

000026
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(

the State believed that the pleadings, answers and admissions had not raised a genuine issue of
material fact.
The State filed a Motion for Summar):' Dismissal on April 16, 2010, together with a Brief
in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal. The State contends that Petitioner's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both the
deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Further, the State contends that Petitioner's claim
of cruel, inhuman and coercive conditions of confinement prior to sentencing fails to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
Specifically, the State argues that Petitioner Perez has failed to establish that counsel's
perfo1mance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and, even if it did, has failed to
establish how that resulted in prejudice. Further, the State argues that the Petitioner has
presented mere conclusory allegations and that the Petitioner's submissions are insufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact. By an order filed April 22, 2010, the State's Motion for
Summary Dismissal was scheduled for hearing on June 8, 2010. Argument was presented and
the court granted the State's Motion for Swnmary Dismissal. No final order was prepared, and
this written mling follows.
APPLICABLE LAW
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature,
State vs. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678,662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827,
830,452, 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,921,828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (App. 1992).
However, it differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action because the application must
contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be

000027
4
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits,
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must
state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. LC. § 19-4903. Thus,
the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations> or the application will be subject to dismissal. A verified pleading that sets forth
evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an
affidavit, and is accorded the same probative force as an affidavit. Camp v. Jimenez, 107 Idaho
878,693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App.1984).
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative.
Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to LC, § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.
Summary judgment will be granted in a civil action when the litigant opposing the
motion fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho
101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988); Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334,337
(Ct.App.1992). As stated in Garzee:
Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish
a prima facie case. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue of material
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Garzee, 121 Idaho at 774, 828 P.2d at 337. This same standard governs motions for summary
dismissal of applications for post-conviction relief. If the applicant facing such a motion fails to
present evidence making a prima facie case, i.e., establishing each essential element of the claim,
then summary dismissal is appropriate. The ·applicant's factual showing must be based upon
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evidence that would be admissible at hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P .2d
546, 551 (Ct.App.1982). Thus, an applicant for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Like a civil litigant
resisting a motion for summary judgment, an applicant opposing summary dismissal under I.C. §
19-4906 must present evidence to supp01t every controverted element of the claim for relief
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 825 P .2d 94 (Ct.App.1992). If the applicant fails to present

evidence establishing an essential element on which he or she bears the burden of proof,
summary dismissal is appropriate.
The Sixth Amendment right to representation by counsel includes the right to be
represented by reasonably competent counsel in an adequate fashion, Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668,685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988); Huck v. Stale, 124 Idaho 155,857 P.2d 634 (1993). An accused is
entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of a diligent, conscientious advocate, State v.
Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8, 539 P.2d 556, 560 (1975).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the postconviction procedure action. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
petitioner must show that the attomey's performance was deficient, and that the petitioner was
prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Hassett v. Stale, 127 Idaho 313,316, 900 P.2d 221, 224
(Ct.App.1995).
To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attomey's
representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,
104 S.Ct. at 2064; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988).
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To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the
attomey's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial (or proceeding) would have been
different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656,
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
There is a strong presumption that defense counsel's performance falls within the wide
range of competent professional assistance, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,922,828 P.2d
1323, 1327 (Ct.App.1992). Second, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, ·the results of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Parrott, 117 Idaho at 274-75, 787 P.2d
at 260-61. This latter "prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's deficient
performance affected the outcome of the case. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366,
370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). To avoid summary dismissal, a post-conviction claim must
sufficiently allege facts under both prongs of the test.
Trial tactics and strategy choices are the province of tiial counsel and will not be deemed
deficient in the absence of evidence that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the law or other objectively ascertainable sho1tcomings. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho
155,857 P.2d 634 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466,469,816 P.2d 1023, 1026
(Ct.App.1991 ).
Rule 201(c), Idaho Rules of Evidence, provides that "A court may take judicial notice,
whether requested or not. When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts
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from the court file in the same or a separate case, the comt shall identify the specific documents
or items that were so noticed (emphasis supplied)." Rule 20l(d), I.R.E., provides when the court
must take judicial notice: "When a party makes an oral or written request that a court take
judicial notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the comt file in the same or a separate
case, the pa1ty shall identify the specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is
requested or shall proffer to the court and serve on all pruties copies of such documents or items.
A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
infonnation." The Respondent State ofldaho has asked the court to take judicial notice of the
record, transcripts and exhibits in the underlying criminal cases, Case Nos. CR-2005-3932 and
CR-2005-6559, State of Idaho v. Mariano Perez Jr.
A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
will survive a motion for summaiy dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of
fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact
exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d
at 833. In ruling on a motion for summary dismissal, the court must review the facts in the light
most favorable to the Petitioner and must determine whether the facts would entitle Petition to
relief if accepted as true. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995).
However, the court is not required to accept either an applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125
Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715
P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.App.1986). Post-conviction relief proceedings are not substitutes for appeals,
and applicants for post-conviction relief are not allowed to raise issues in post-conviction
proceedings that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the issues were know known and
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could not reasonably have been known during the direct appeal. Section 19-490 I(b ), Idaho
Code; Hollon vs. State, 132 Idaho 573,581,976 P.2d 927,935 (1999); Raudebaugh v. State,
1365 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (2001).

ANALYSIS

Failure to Investigate Petitioner's Fitness to Stand Trial, to Evaluate Plea Options, to
Plead Guilty, and to be Sentenced
A review of the record reflects that Petitioner Perez has offered purely conclusory
statements with regard to these claims. He has not presented any evidence, admissible at an
evidentiary hearing, nor articulated any facts in supp01t of a claim that he was not fit to stand
trial; that he was not fit to evaluate plea options; that he was not fit or competent to plead guilty;
or that he was not fit or competent to be sentenced. Both at the time of his change of plea on
September 13, 2005, and at the time of his sentencing on March 31, 2006, Perez's statements and
demeanor demonstrated ample awareness and understanding of the proceedings.
The court had ordered a psychological evaluation of Petitioner Perez, together with a PreSentence Investigation rep011. The comt also specifically advised Perez of his right to the
assistance and advice of counsel. The court-ordered psychological evaluation was conducted by
Dr. Craig Beaver, a licensed psychologist who maintained a private practice and also served as
director of neuropsychological services at the Elks Rehabilitation Hospital in Boise. Dr. Beaver
had the opportunity to review Perez's prior criminal history, incarceration history, prior records
and evaluations in connection with his assessment. Counsel for Perez called Dr. Beaver as a
witness for the defense at the sentencing hearing held March 31, 2006, in supp01t of his capacity
for rehabilitation. During that hearing, Dr. Beaver testified that Perez was "very bright" and that,
while he displayed certain paranoia when he was doing methamphetamine, Perez demonstrated
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no fo1mal psychiatric problems when he has been clean (from methamphetamine) for a period of
time.
Thus, in contrast to Perez's assertion, his psychological condition was addressed in the
relevant time fran1e and no fitness issues were identified. Petitioner has not demonstrated any
deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel in this regard, nor has he demonstrated how
any claimed deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. In contrast to Perez's
allegations, the court record disproves his claims.

Failure to Advocate for Adequate Pre~Trial Conditions of Detention
Petitioner's original prose affidavit set forth allegations about his conditions of
confinement, but also indicated that those conditions ended prior to his appearing before the
cow·t to plead guilty on September 13 1 2005. As set forth above, the record of the court
proceedings reveals that a psychological evaluation of Perez was conducted in connection with
the sentencing process, and that no psychiatric issues were identified.

Perez has not presented

admissible evidence, which is neither conclusory nor speculative, to demonstrate how his
attorney's performance was deficient in relation to his conditions of confinement, or how any
perfmmance on the part of his attorney caused him prejudice in the outcome of the criminal
cases. [The comt will address separately the allegation regarding how the conditions of
confinement contributed to the coerciveness of his plea.]

Utilized Coercive Conditions ofPre-Trial Detention to Force Petitioner to Enter Pleas of
Guilty
No supplemental affidavit was filed in support of the Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief. However, in reviewing the Petitioner's original prose affidavit, it can be read
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as contending that his plea was coerced by unsatisfactory pre-trial detention conditions and the
actions of his attorney. Specifically, Perez said that his lawyer told him that she" (3) ....probably
could get a deal from the prosecutor. In which included being moved out of X2 unit to unit Dtank along with dropping a battery assault and persistent violator charge. (4) Petitioner was then
moved out of X-2 tank and no longer subjected to it's (sic) hon'ible living conditions. (5)
Approximately one (1) week later from the above incident of paragraph 3 Counsel informed
Petitioner that the prosecution would not drop one (1) of the assault charges nor the persistent
violator charge and it would be an open sentence. Petitioner stated "I will not take that deal."
Counsel got mad and irritated .... and [informed him] that he would have to return to X-2 tank.
As a result of counsel's coercive behavior and threat of Petitioner going back to X-2 tank,
Petitioner accepted the deal."
A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if it is 'voluntary" and "intelligent." Bousley,
523 U.S. at 618 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). A guilty plea is
deemed valid when a defendant is advised of the nature and elements of the charges against him
and the possible punishment and understands that he is waiving his constitutional rights to avoid
self-incrimination, to confront his accuser, and to have a jury decide his case. Brady, 397 U.S. at
749. Additionally, to be valid, a plea must not be made based on threats, misrepresentations, or
improper promises. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56. Perez did not raise the claim of
involuntary plea on appeal. Having failed to do so, his claim is baned absent a showing of cause
and prejudice or actual innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,622 (1998)
At the change of plea hearing on September 13, 2005, pursuant to plea negotiations, the
Defendant plead guilty in Case No. CR-2005-6559 to the offense of Aggravated Battery on a
Law Enforcement Officer, plus the Pa11 II Persistent Violator enhancement. In Case No. CR-
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2005-3932, Perez also plead guilty to one count of Aggravated Assault (upon the person of
Suzanne Lawson), plus the Part II Persistent _Yiolator enhancement contained in the Amended
Information. As pa1t of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved his right to appeal the
coutt's decision on the Motion to Suppress Evidence in Case No. CR-2005-6559. In exchange
for the pleas of guilty, the State agreed to dismiss several additional felony charges in Case No.
CR-2005-3932: (a) Count II, Aggravated Assault upon the person of George W. Norris, in
violation ofldaho Code 18-901(a orb); 18-905(a); (b) Count III, Aggravated Assault upon the
person of Kasara R, Stroebel, in violation ofldaho Code 18-901(a orb); 18-905(a); (c) Count IV,
Unlawful Possession ofa Firearm, in violation ofldaho Code Section 18-3316; and (d) Count V,
Injury to Child-Felony, upon the person of E.L., nine days old, in violation ofldaho Code
Section 18-1501(1). Additionally, the State agreed to dismiss four (4) Persistent Violator
allegations in Part II.
Petitioner Perez was present when the State advised that there were no underlying
sentencing agreements in the two cases, other than the State's willingness to dismiss the
additional charges and persistent violator enhancements in Case No. CR-2005-3932. The comt
again advised Perez of the maximum penalties for the charges to which he intended to plead
guilty. The colloquy between the cowt and the Petitioner reveals that he was advised about the
following:
(a) The court examined the Petitioner and determined that he was pleading guilty
because the allegations were true and that no one had forced him to do so;
(b) The Petitioner was advised of, and indicated that he understood, that a plea of guilty
would constitute a waiver or giving up of certain rights and privileges, including the
right to stand trial by jury; the right to confront and cross-examine the State's
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witnesses in open court; the right to the court's subpoena powers to call witnesses in
his own behalf; the presumption of innocence and the privilege against selfincrimination, as well as the right to assert any defenses to the charges to which he
was pleading guilty, with the exception in Case No. CR-2005-6559, where he
retained his right to challenge the court's denial of his Motion to Suppress Evidence;
(c) The comt advised the Petitioner that it was not a patty to any agreements and was
bound at sentencing only by the maximum possible penalties as fixed by law.
(d) The court examined the Petitioner and detennined that he had understood the
discussions which he had had with his attorney; that he was twenty-eight (28) years
old; that he had completed up to the tenth grade, but that he had received his GED.
(e) Petitioner indicated to the court that he understood what the choices were in his cases.

(f) Petitioner also stated that he was satisfied with the representation of his attorney; that
he had not taken any dlugs or medications in the preceding 24 hours, or any other
substance that would affect his ability to understand these proceedings.
(g) The court questioned the Petitioner concerning whether there were any threats or
promises made to get him to change his pleas to guilty. The Petitioner said that there
were not.
(h) The court questioned whether the Petitioner had had adequate time to discuss these
cases with his attorney. The Petitioner indicated that he had had sufficient time to
discuss the cases.
(I ) The court questioned the Petitioner concerning whether he believed that his attomey

000036
13
ORDER ON STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

had done everything that he had expected her to do in these cases. The Petitioner
advised the court that there was nothing which he had asked his attorney to do that
she had not done.
Statements made in open court at the time of a plea carry a strong presumption of verity
and are entitled to great weight. Citizen v. Hunter, 809 F. 2d 560, 562 (9 th Cir. 1986) (citing
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1977). Even though that presumption is not

necessarily an insurmountable barrier to an evidentiary hearing, the "subsequent presentation of
conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are
contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 75 (1977) (citations omitted).
The court concludes that, on the record before it, Petitioner Perez has failed to present
specific, admissible facts that are consistent with the actual court record and that support his
claim that his attorney's performance with regard to his plea was defective, and/or that the
attorney's performance resulted in prejudice to him. First, although Petitioner contends that the
State was unwilling to dismiss assault, battery and persistent violator charges, it appears that a
number of felony charges and persistent violator enhancements were in fact dismissed. Further,
Petitioner retained the right to challenge the cowt's suppression ruling in Case No. CR-20056559 on appeal. In the cases involving the Petitioner's shooting of the police officer, the State
made clear that there were no agreements concerning recommendations for an underlying
sentence, and an accused has no right to a plea bargain. The court also, in more than one
context, advised the Petitioner that the court was not a party to the negotiations and made no
promises concerning a sentence. Petitioner Perez, in open court, stated that he was satisfied with
his attorney's performance and that he was not pressured, coerced, or threatened in any way to
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accept the plea negotiation, which involved dismissal of numerous felonies and potential
sentencing enhancements. In fact, Perez told the court that he was pleading guilty because the
charges were true; that no one was forcing him to plead guilty; that he adequate time to talk to
his attorney about the charges; that his attorney had done all the things that he would have
expected her to do in representing him; he stated that there were not things that she had failed to
do that he had wanted her to do. Petitioner's contentions about his detention conditions were
conclusory, were unclear concerning the time frame relative to the plea, and did not demonstrate
that the conditions were in any way inhumane or inappropriate considering the need to protect
him within the jail population because of his prior history, gang affiliation, the nature of his
charges, his potential escape risk (as a result'of fleeing to Nevada and being apprehended there),
statements attributed to him that he may take further action to protect himself if captured, etc.
Perez has not raised a factual issue that even if his counsel had made unprofessional e1rnrs in the
context of discussing the plea options with him, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. This is especially hue since the sentence in Case No. CR-2005-3932 ran concmTent
with the sentence in Case No. CR-2005-6559, where he expressed an intent to plead guilty and to
challenge the court's suppression ruling on appeal.

FaUure to Research and Present Arguments on Appeal as Directed by PeUtioner

The record contains no specific facts in support of the allegation that Perez's appellate
counsel was ineffective. Again, Petitioner Perez has offered only a general conclusory
allegation, unsuppo11ed by any admissible evidence identifying what alleged research and legally
cognizable arguments that he directed appellate counsel to present that were not presented. The
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact with regard to the alleged
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deficient performance of appellate counsel, and he has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of
material fact with the regard to how he was allegedly prejudiced by the performance of appellate
counsel.

ORDER
On the grounds and for the reasons stated, the court does hereby grant the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c), and does hereby
dismiss this action with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this

3,,

6?/1J-::AL
day of April, 2011.

a

Juneal~(?

~

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been fo1warded to
the following, either by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:

Mimurn Law Office, PLLC
Canyon County Public Defender
510 Arthur Street
Caldwell, Idaho 83605
Bryan F, Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
Canyon County Courthouse
1115 Albany
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

Dated this----=---- day of

ff[ 9!p

, 201 l.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO
Clerk of the Cow1

by_{!__Q_M--'---'t't...._,_....111.A_~-Deputy Clerk
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